In the existing scientific literature, the “effects of government rotation” on the implementation of peace agreements during the civil war are still little studied, although previous studies claim that government rotation is a major problem for political continuity (e.g.B. Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001; Tavits and Letki, 2009; Potrafke, 2011; Blum and Niklas, 2019), because two different forms of government change – change of leader (change of leader) and ideological change (change of political ideology of the sovereign) – are common traits of all these countries studied (Horowitz, Hoff and Milanovic, 2009). Blaydes, Lisa & Maïo, Jennifer De, “Spoiling the peace? Peace process exclusivity and political violence in North-central Africa”, Civil Wars, vol. 12, n° 1-2 (2010): 3-28. Paris, R. (2009). Understand the problem of coordination in post-war state building. A R. Paris &T. D. Sisk (Eds), The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations (pp.
67-92). London: Routledge. On the other hand, Toft (2009) argues that top priority should be given to security sector reform (SSR) in order to combat “greed” and “fear” of bellicose motives. In other words, lasting peace after conflicts remains elusive if ex-rebels are not properly integrated into their societies. In this regard, the Niger Delta (Nigeria) is a good example of how the government`s poorly implemented disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (GDR) programme has increased insecurity in the daily lives of citizens (Aghedo, 2013). An estimated 158 peace agreements have included provisions for territorial power-sharing in the form of autonomy (Wise, 2018). Territorial power-sharing can prolong peace in the post-agreement phase, while military power-sharing has no significant influence on the duration of peace (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003). Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) state that poorly structured and incomplete military integration (MI) agreements are most often linked to the failure of peacebuilding. On the contrary, Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty focused on three types of integrated peace agreement safeguards — transitional power-sharing arrangements, dispute settlement and verification mechanisms — that increase the implementation of peace agreements by more than 47 percent (Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty, 2017). Ruggeri, A., Dorussen, H., &Gizelis, T. I.
(2017). Winning peace on the ground: UN peacekeeping and local conflicts. International Organization, 71(1), 163-185. Jarstad, A. K., &Nilsson, D. (2008). From words to deeds: the transposition of power-sharing pacts into peace agreements. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25(3), 206-223. Hartzell, C., &Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalization of peace: power-sharing and conflict management after the civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 318-332.
Doyle, M. W., &Sambanis, N. (2000). Promotion of international peace: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. The American Political Science Review, 94(4), 779-801. Negotiated settlements can collapse due to a lack of trust, a poor appreciation of the rebels` capabilities by the government, and the rebels` fear of government commitment (DeRouen Jr., Bercovitch, & Wei, 2009). Violence returns after settlement, when incitement to violence exists, people`s complaints are not respected, signatories` commitments are not respected, human rights violations persist and ex-combatants are not supported, and social and psychological support is not provided to ex-combatants (Aghedo, 2013). This implies that the implementation of peace agreements is a multidimensional issue that relies heavily on integrated protection measures, third-party interventions, and the state`s ability to maintain peace, to name a few.
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